Empirical Validation of Design Principles for Survivable System Architecture

Survivability, the ability of a system to minimize the impact of a finite-duration disturbance on end-user value delivery, is increasingly recognized beyond military contexts as an enabler of maintaining system performance in operational environments characterized by dynamic disturbances. Seventeen general design principles are proposed to inform concept generation of survivable system architectures. Six of these design principles focus on a survivability strategy of susceptibility reduction: (1.1) prevention, (1.2) mobility, (1.3) concealment, (1.4) deterrence, (1.5) preemption, and (1.6) avoidance. Eleven of the principles focus on vulnerability reduction: (2.1) hardness, (2.2) redundancy, (2.3) margin, (2.4) heterogeneity, (2.5) distribution, (2.6) failure mode reduction, (2.7) fail-safe, (2.8) evolution, (2.9) containment, (2.10) replacement, and (2.11) repair. In this paper, the completeness, taxonomic precision, and domain-specific applicability of the design principle framework is empirically tested through case applications to survivability features of the F-16C combat aircraft and Iridium satellite system. Integrating results of these two tests with previous tests (e.g., UH-60A Blackhawk helicopter, A-10A aircraft), the validity of the design principle framework for aerospace systems is demonstrated.