DocumentCode
3451514
Title
Permutation-based steganographic channels
Author
Forest, Kevin ; Knight, Scott
Author_Institution
R. Mil. Coll. of Canada, Kingston, ON, Canada
fYear
2009
fDate
19-22 Oct. 2009
Firstpage
67
Lastpage
73
Abstract
Covert channels are a mechanism that allows an attacker to parasitically place messages within a legitimate channel. Detection of these covert channels can have consequences for an attacker. Not only is the ability to communicate lost or compromised, but analysis of the channel can lead to the identity of the attacker themselves. If the attacker is a wanted criminal or foreign intelligence service, these consequences can be quite severe. This paper proposes a covert channel with the property of unattributability. That is, in the event the channel is detected, nothing about the channel gives any clues as to the identity of the attacker. The unattributable nature of the covert channel has a cost, however, in that the channel is one-way, with the attacker being unable to send messages, only receive them. As such, the proof-of-concept design uses this covert channel to transmit sensitive information from an infected machine.
Keywords
steganography; telecommunication channels; covert channels; permutation-based steganographic channels; proof-of-concept design; unattributability property; Communication channels; Communication system control; Computer networks; Costs; Event detection; Invasive software; Steganography; Surveillance; Transmitters; Web pages; Covert Channels; Information hiding; Steganographic Channels;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Risks and Security of Internet and Systems (CRiSIS), 2009 Fourth International Conference on
Conference_Location
Toulouse
ISSN
2151-4763
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-4498-4
Electronic_ISBN
2151-4763
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CRISIS.2009.5411975
Filename
5411975
Link To Document