Title :
Supply Chain Coordination Problem with Loss-Averse Retailer and Buyback Contract
Author :
Shi, Kuiran ; Zhang, Xiao ; Zhao, Lin
Author_Institution :
Coll. of Econ. & Manage., Nanjing Univ. of Technol., Nanjing
Abstract :
This paper studies a manufacturer-retailer channel facing uncertain demand. A single manufacturer sells a perishable product to a single retailer in decentralized supply chain. It is assumed that the manufacturer is risk neutral and the retailer is loss averse. The objective is to design the supply contract that provides a win-win coordination mechanism between the manufacturer and the retailer. The analytical and numerical results lend insight into how a manufacturer can design a contract to improve total supply chain performance. In particular, it is shown that the buyback contract can coordinate the supply chain. The impact of the retailer´s loss aversion on the retailer´s optimal order quantity is also investigated.
Keywords :
contracts; retailing; supply chain management; buyback contract; loss-averse retailer; manufacturer-retailer channel; risk neutral; supply chain coordination problem; win-win coordination mechanism; Contracts; Educational institutions; Paper technology; Performance analysis; Pulp manufacturing; Risk analysis; Supply chain management; Supply chains; Technology management; Virtual manufacturing;
Conference_Titel :
Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing, 2008. WiCOM '08. 4th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Dalian
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2107-7
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2108-4
DOI :
10.1109/WiCom.2008.1616