Title :
Domination in Iterated Prisoner´s Dilemma
Author :
Brown, J.A. ; Ashlock, D.A.
Author_Institution :
Univ. of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canada
Abstract :
Domination is a concept in Game Theory which has not been fully explored in the Iterated Prisoner\´s Dilemma. The idea of domination has previously been restricted to current moves looking at a single game and not a sequence of moves. An extension of the notion of domination is made that allows for the formalization of various behaviours exhibited in agents playing IPD. This formalization organizes behaviours such as "nice" into sets of dominated agents in an elegant fashion. In this initial study, we focus on dominators for sets of agents drawn from the set: Always Cooperate, Always Defect, and Tit-for-Tat.
Keywords :
game theory; IPD; agent behaviour formalization; always cooperate; always defect; game theory; iterated prisoner dilemma domination; tit-for-tat; Biology; Evolutionary computation; Game theory; Games; Internet; Thin film transistors; Game theory;
Conference_Titel :
Electrical and Computer Engineering (CCECE), 2011 24th Canadian Conference on
Conference_Location :
Niagara Falls, ON
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-9788-1
Electronic_ISBN :
0840-7789
DOI :
10.1109/CCECE.2011.6030637