Model of Allocating the Emission Rights: Based on the Incentive, Fair and Efficient Measure

Environment pollution problems attracted many attention in recent years. How to solve the problems by using the market power is the main study to which the scholars devoted much. In this paper, we have a brief retrospect about the process of permit emission right problems study in which the researchers draw much attention on confirming the price or studying the efficiency of the transaction market. However, we build up a model in which we allocate the emission rights to the users who produce the products to create benefit as well as discharge the pollution to cut down this profit. We try to include the factors of impartiality, benefit, incentive and so on, which could make the distribution more suitable to the society. Following the Stackelberg leader-follower model, we try to describe the real situation by using the incentive measure and at the same time, we do not neglect the fair and benefit factors. At last, we give a simple numerical example to explain this model concretely, and some improved advices are given at the end.