• DocumentCode
    3468524
  • Title

    Apply Repeated Games to Solve "Prisoner\´s Dilemma" Problem in E-Commerce

  • Author

    Zeng Ping ; Zou Lifang

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Bus. & Tourism Manage., Yunnan Univ., Kunming, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    7-9 Nov. 2010
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    4
  • Abstract
    This paper describes the use of game theory to analyze the "prisoner\´s dilemma" phenomenon inherent in Electronic Commerce. Analysis yielded the following conclusions: Results of one-time game between both sides is invalid (fraud, fraud).Repeated games can achieve the effective Nash equilibrium (honesty, honesty) between both sides in the process of transaction. Repeated games can maintain long-term cooperative relationships between merchants and consumers, promoting the development of e-commerce. This paper delves deeper into the effects of repeated game theory.
  • Keywords
    cooperative systems; electronic commerce; game theory; Nash equilibrium; e-commerce; electronic commerce; game theory; long-term cooperative relationships; prisoner dilemma; Analytical models; Games; Government; Nash equilibrium; Publishing;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    E-Product E-Service and E-Entertainment (ICEEE), 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Henan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-7159-1
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICEEE.2010.5660472
  • Filename
    5660472