DocumentCode
3468524
Title
Apply Repeated Games to Solve "Prisoner\´s Dilemma" Problem in E-Commerce
Author
Zeng Ping ; Zou Lifang
Author_Institution
Sch. of Bus. & Tourism Manage., Yunnan Univ., Kunming, China
fYear
2010
fDate
7-9 Nov. 2010
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
4
Abstract
This paper describes the use of game theory to analyze the "prisoner\´s dilemma" phenomenon inherent in Electronic Commerce. Analysis yielded the following conclusions: Results of one-time game between both sides is invalid (fraud, fraud).Repeated games can achieve the effective Nash equilibrium (honesty, honesty) between both sides in the process of transaction. Repeated games can maintain long-term cooperative relationships between merchants and consumers, promoting the development of e-commerce. This paper delves deeper into the effects of repeated game theory.
Keywords
cooperative systems; electronic commerce; game theory; Nash equilibrium; e-commerce; electronic commerce; game theory; long-term cooperative relationships; prisoner dilemma; Analytical models; Games; Government; Nash equilibrium; Publishing;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
E-Product E-Service and E-Entertainment (ICEEE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Henan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-7159-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICEEE.2010.5660472
Filename
5660472
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