Title :
Study on incentive interruptible load contract with risk preference of power companies
Author :
Qi, Quan ; Li, Xue ; Li, Yuzeng
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Autom., Shanghai Univ., Shanghai
Abstract :
Interruptible load contract is an effective tool to evade the risk of market price of power companies in electricity market. Based on the mechanism design theory, this paper develops an incentive interruptible load contract model for discrete customer types, which takes risk preference of power companies into account. The proposed model will lead customers to voluntarily reveal their true customer types, and choose the right contracts. A numerical example is presented to verify the effectiveness of the proposed model.
Keywords :
contracts; incentive schemes; power markets; electricity market; incentive interruptible load contract; market price; power companies; risk preference; Bridges; Contracts; Costs; Electricity supply industry; Electricity supply industry deregulation; Fluctuations; Load modeling; Power generation; Power systems; Supervisory control; Certain equivalent; electricity market; interruptible load; mechanism design; risk preference;
Conference_Titel :
Electric Utility Deregulation and Restructuring and Power Technologies, 2008. DRPT 2008. Third International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Nanjuing
Print_ISBN :
978-7-900714-13-8
Electronic_ISBN :
978-7-900714-13-8
DOI :
10.1109/DRPT.2008.4523474
