Title :
On proportional power sharing mechanisms for secondary spectrum markets
Author :
Berry, Randall A.
Author_Institution :
Dept. of EECS, Northwestern Univ., Evanston, IL, USA
Abstract :
We consider a proportional sharing mechanism for allocating spectrum to secondary users. Each user bids for a portion of the received power at a measurement point and receives a share that is proportional to its bid while paying a charge equal to the bid. The users then transmit over a common band treating all interference as noise. Under this mechanism, we model the secondary users as players is a bidding game. The players´ interaction in this game is complicated due to the interference among them.We characterize the existence of a Nash equilibrium for both price taking and price anticipating users.
Keywords :
game theory; radio spectrum management; radiofrequency interference; Nash equilibrium; interference; proportional power sharing mechanisms; secondary spectrum markets; spectrum allocation; Charge measurement; Conferences; Current measurement; Game theory; Interference constraints; Licenses; Nash equilibrium; Power measurement; Resource management; USA Councils;
Conference_Titel :
Computational Advances in Multi-Sensor Adaptive Processing (CAMSAP), 2009 3rd IEEE International Workshop on
Conference_Location :
Aruba, Dutch Antilles
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5179-1
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5180-7
DOI :
10.1109/CAMSAP.2009.5413318
