Title :
Market clearing price discovery in a single and double-side auction market mechanisms: Linear programming solution
Author :
Gutiérrez, G. ; Quiñónez, J. ; Sheblé, G.B.
Author_Institution :
Inst. Tecnol. de Morelia, Morelia
Abstract :
This paper analyzes the market price discovery process in an auction market structure. The market clearing price determines the market equilibrium, price and quantity. Once price discovery occurs, the bids are committed, and contracts are written Single and double-side auction market structures are analyzed. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the market clearing prices discovery.
Keywords :
linear programming; power markets; auction market mechanisms; linear programming solution; market clearing price discovery; Artificial intelligence; Consumer electronics; Contracts; Explosions; Investments; Lagrangian functions; Linear programming; Privacy; Resource management; Auction mechanism; market clearing price;
Conference_Titel :
Power Tech, 2005 IEEE Russia
Conference_Location :
St. Petersburg
Print_ISBN :
978-5-93208-034-4
Electronic_ISBN :
978-5-93208-034-4
DOI :
10.1109/PTC.2005.4524694