A New CRT-RSA Scheme Resistant to Power Analysis and Fault Attacks

This paper considers a secure and practical CRT-RSA signature implementation resistant to fault attacks (FA) and power attacks including simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). In 2005, Giraud proposed a CRT-RSA scheme secure against SPA and FA. Afterwards, Kim and Quisquater presented an efficient scheme which can prevent all SPA, DPA, and FA. In this paper, we point out that Giraud´s scheme can be broken by a relative doubling attack (RDA) and Kim and Quisquater´s is vulnerable to (N-1) attack. We propose a new CRT-RSA scheme secure against all known power analysis and fault attacks by modifying a random message blinding exponentiation algorithm. Furthermore, since our scheme has no inverse operation, it is both practical and efficient due to the low computational load compared to other existing literatures.