Space-Time Related Pairwise Key Predistribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks

Most of existing pairwise key predistribution schemes (PKPS) for wireless sensor networks (WSN) have a common security vulnerability that an illegitimate node can use the keying material of a compromised node to set up pairwise keys with any non-compromised nodes in the network. Using this vulnerability, we propose the clone attack against WSN. To our knowledge, by far no PKPS can defend against this attack We propose a polynomial based space-time related pairwise key predistribution scheme (PSPP), in which the keying material of a node can only works at its initial deployment location. Analysis shows that PSPP cannot only defend against the clone attack but also even baffle the execution of other attacks, e.g. sybile attack cannot work in PSPP. Finally, we propose the extended PSPP (EPSPP), which has better collusion resistance.