DocumentCode
3500282
Title
A Study on the Signaling Mechanism of Corporate Reputation
Author
Liang Jing ; Wang Lei
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage., Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou
fYear
2007
fDate
21-25 Sept. 2007
Firstpage
3277
Lastpage
3280
Abstract
The asymmetric information universally exists in the market, especially for consumers\´ complex purchase behavior, the difficulty of comprehending the intrinsic attributes of the product would induce "adverse select" behavior. As the accumulative asset of a company, the formation of reputation is path-dependent, so reputation can represent the consistent quality of the product, and help consumers make right decision on product quality with lower searching costs under information asymmetry condition. Based on an empirical investigation in the notebook market, this paper would analyze the signaling mechanism and the impact on consumer\´s behavior of corporate reputation, and then provide advice to corporate reputation management. In the end the paper would summarize the future research.
Keywords
marketing; production management; corporate reputation; notebook market; product quality; signaling mechanism; Consumer behavior; Cost function; Eyes; Reflection; Signal analysis; Signal processing; Warranties;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing, 2007. WiCom 2007. International Conference on
Conference_Location
Shanghai
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-1311-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/WICOM.2007.812
Filename
4340587
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