• DocumentCode
    3500282
  • Title

    A Study on the Signaling Mechanism of Corporate Reputation

  • Author

    Liang Jing ; Wang Lei

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Manage., Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou
  • fYear
    2007
  • fDate
    21-25 Sept. 2007
  • Firstpage
    3277
  • Lastpage
    3280
  • Abstract
    The asymmetric information universally exists in the market, especially for consumers\´ complex purchase behavior, the difficulty of comprehending the intrinsic attributes of the product would induce "adverse select" behavior. As the accumulative asset of a company, the formation of reputation is path-dependent, so reputation can represent the consistent quality of the product, and help consumers make right decision on product quality with lower searching costs under information asymmetry condition. Based on an empirical investigation in the notebook market, this paper would analyze the signaling mechanism and the impact on consumer\´s behavior of corporate reputation, and then provide advice to corporate reputation management. In the end the paper would summarize the future research.
  • Keywords
    marketing; production management; corporate reputation; notebook market; product quality; signaling mechanism; Consumer behavior; Cost function; Eyes; Reflection; Signal analysis; Signal processing; Warranties;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing, 2007. WiCom 2007. International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Shanghai
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-1311-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/WICOM.2007.812
  • Filename
    4340587