DocumentCode :
3504509
Title :
Evolutionary game analysis on the effective co-opetition mechanism of partners within high quality pork supply chain
Author :
Sun, Shimin ; Zhang, Jianru ; Lin, Hai
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Shandong Agric. Univ., Tai´´an
Volume :
2
fYear :
2008
fDate :
12-15 Oct. 2008
Firstpage :
2066
Lastpage :
2071
Abstract :
In this paper, the conception of effective co-opetition mechanism in high quality pork supply chain has been analyzed. The evolutional processes of co-opetition mechanism and related influencing factors have been studied by using the dual population evolutionary game theory. The result showed that evolution of co-opetition is influenced by 8 factors, which are cooperation cost, cooperation income, coefficient of income distribution, decrease of cooperative risk, coefficient of risk compensation, probability of risk, management scale, and coefficients of either encouragement or punishment. It also suggested that the achievement of effective competition-cooperation of high quality pork supply chain would be improved by decreasing cooperation costs, increasing cooperation incomes, and building the equitable and effective systems of income distribution, risk compensation, as well as encouragement and punishment.
Keywords :
costing; evolutionary computation; food products; game theory; risk management; supply chain management; co-opetition mechanism; cooperation cost; cooperation income; cooperative risk; evolutionary game analysis; high quality pork supply chain; income distribution coefficient; risk compensation coefficient; Effective coopetition; Evolutionary Stable Strategy; Evolutive game; High quality pork supply chain; Replicator dynamics;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, 2008. IEEE/SOLI 2008. IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Beijing
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2012-4
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2013-1
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/SOLI.2008.4682873
Filename :
4682873
Link To Document :
بازگشت