DocumentCode
3504934
Title
Vertical structure for asymmetrical chain to chain competition based on bargaining power
Author
Liao, Tao ; Ai, Xingzheng ; Tang, Xiaowo ; Teng, Xueke
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., UESTS, Chengdu
Volume
2
fYear
2008
fDate
12-15 Oct. 2008
Firstpage
2171
Lastpage
2176
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of bargaining power on vertical structure under asymmetrical chain to chain competition, and analyze the evolution process of vertical structure under different conditions. We find that bargaining power have important influence on the choice of vertical structure. The paper generalized Iyer´s result, and present theoretical proof for channel structure choice under asymmetrical chain to chain competition.
Keywords
game theory; pricing; retailing; supply chain management; asymmetrical chain-to-chain competition; bargaining power; channel structure choice; evolution process; game theory; pricing; retailing; vertical structure; Bargaining Power; Chain to Chain Competition; Evolution Equilibrium; Vertical Structure;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, 2008. IEEE/SOLI 2008. IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location
Beijing
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-2012-4
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-2013-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/SOLI.2008.4682894
Filename
4682894
Link To Document