DocumentCode
3507582
Title
Performance Comparisons of Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Different Game Patterns
Author
Da Qingli ; Li Xinjun ; Lin Hsinyi
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Southeast Univ., Nanjing
fYear
2007
fDate
21-25 Sept. 2007
Firstpage
4890
Lastpage
4893
Abstract
In the light of closed-loop supply chains composed of a manufacturer and two retailers, where retailers indirectly collect used products, the impact of the decision rights leadership on the efficiency is examined using three models, based on game theory. When retailers break the decision making authority equilibrium, and one retailer has order decision priority, the optimal profit of the retailers and manufacturer and the collect effort coefficient are all improved; the optimal profit of the whole supply chains, the consumer surplus and social welfares are also the biggest; therefore, the whole performance of supply chains is the best and thus social efficiency is the highest.
Keywords
game theory; supply chains; closed loop supply chains; decision making authority equilibrium; different game patterns; optimal profit; Costs; Game theory; International trade; Production; Pulp manufacturing; Reflection; Supply chain management; Supply chains; Technology management; Virtual manufacturing;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing, 2007. WiCom 2007. International Conference on
Conference_Location
Shanghai
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-1311-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/WICOM.2007.1198
Filename
4340973
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