• DocumentCode
    3507582
  • Title

    Performance Comparisons of Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Different Game Patterns

  • Author

    Da Qingli ; Li Xinjun ; Lin Hsinyi

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Southeast Univ., Nanjing
  • fYear
    2007
  • fDate
    21-25 Sept. 2007
  • Firstpage
    4890
  • Lastpage
    4893
  • Abstract
    In the light of closed-loop supply chains composed of a manufacturer and two retailers, where retailers indirectly collect used products, the impact of the decision rights leadership on the efficiency is examined using three models, based on game theory. When retailers break the decision making authority equilibrium, and one retailer has order decision priority, the optimal profit of the retailers and manufacturer and the collect effort coefficient are all improved; the optimal profit of the whole supply chains, the consumer surplus and social welfares are also the biggest; therefore, the whole performance of supply chains is the best and thus social efficiency is the highest.
  • Keywords
    game theory; supply chains; closed loop supply chains; decision making authority equilibrium; different game patterns; optimal profit; Costs; Game theory; International trade; Production; Pulp manufacturing; Reflection; Supply chain management; Supply chains; Technology management; Virtual manufacturing;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing, 2007. WiCom 2007. International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Shanghai
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-1311-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/WICOM.2007.1198
  • Filename
    4340973