DocumentCode :
3511156
Title :
Security Analysis of Gagne et al.´s Threshold Attribute-Based Signcryption Scheme
Author :
Chang-Ji Wang ; Jia-Sen Huang ; Wen-Long Lin ; Hai-Tao Lin
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Inf. Sci. & Technol., Sun Yat-sen Univ., Guangzhou, China
fYear :
2013
fDate :
9-11 Sept. 2013
Firstpage :
103
Lastpage :
108
Abstract :
In SCN2010, Gagne, Narayan, and Safavi-Naini proposed attribute-based signcryption with threshold structure. As in cipher text-policy attribute-based encryption, a sender can specify the access structure of recipients, and as in attribute-based signature, each recipient can verify the sender´s attributes. In contrast to the access structure of recipients, the access structure of the sender needs to be fixed in the setup phase. In this paper, we show that Gagne et al.´s threshold attribute-based signcryption is not secure and give a concrete forgery attack. The attack can make use some keys to construct any other legal keys and at last totally break the scheme. We also show that the attack is effective on other attribute-based cryptographic schemes with the same key structure.
Keywords :
public key cryptography; attribute-based cryptographic schemes; attribute-based signature; cipher text-policy attribute-based encryption; forgery attack; security analysis; threshold attribute-based signcryption scheme; Encryption; Games; Identity-based encryption; Polynomials; attribute-based encryption; attribute-based signature; bilinear pairings; threshold attribute-based signcryption;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems (INCoS), 2013 5th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Xi´an
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/INCoS.2013.23
Filename :
6630393
Link To Document :
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