Title :
On Security Model of One-Round Authenticated Key Exchange
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Inf. Sci. & Technol., Sun Yat-Sun Univ., Guangzhou, China
Abstract :
Considering one-round AKE, Cremers and Feltz at ESORICS 2012 defined a security model with perfect forward secrecy (PFS). However, in that model Boyd and and Nieto´s general attack about PFS is unworkable. This paper extends their model to capture the general attack and shows that a compiled one-round AKE protocol does not achieve the PFS in the extended model. It suggests to withstand the general attack by extra assumptions.
Keywords :
cryptographic protocols; Boyd general attack; Nieto general attack; PFS; one-round AKE protocol; one-round authenticated key exchange; perfect forward secrecy; security model; Educational institutions; Games; Hardware; Protocols; Public key; forward secrecy; models; one-round AKE;
Conference_Titel :
Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems (INCoS), 2013 5th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Xi´an
DOI :
10.1109/INCoS.2013.59
