Title : 
Market Power in Power Markets: Game Theory vs. Agent-Based Approach
         
        
            Author : 
Saguan, Marcelo ; Keseric, Nenad ; Dessante, Philippe ; Glachant, Jean-Michel
         
        
            Author_Institution : 
Supelec
         
        
        
        
        
        
            Abstract : 
Game theory and agent-based economics approaches have been used to study imperfect competition in electricity markets. In this paper these two approaches are firstly described and compared using a simple text book example. Simulations show that the two approaches converge to the same outcome when unique Nash equilibrium exists and assumptions in the game theory approach are realistic. Finally, a 3 Latin American countries\´ power market ("Mercado Electrico Andino") is studied. A simple benefits analysis of new interconnection capacity for this regional market shows the importance of proper assumptions and the complementarities of both approaches
         
        
            Keywords : 
game theory; power markets; power system economics; power system interconnection; Latin American countries; Nash equilibrium; agent-based approach; agent-based economics; game theory; interconnection capacity; market power; power markets; Analytical models; Books; Electricity supply industry; Game theory; Helium; Nash equilibrium; Power generation economics; Power markets; Production; South America; agent-based economics; electricity prices; game theory; market design; market power; transmission;
         
        
        
        
            Conference_Titel : 
Transmission & Distribution Conference and Exposition: Latin America, 2006. TDC '06. IEEE/PES
         
        
            Conference_Location : 
Caracas
         
        
            Print_ISBN : 
1-4244-0287-5
         
        
            Electronic_ISBN : 
1-4244-0288-3
         
        
        
            DOI : 
10.1109/TDCLA.2006.311439