Game analysis of government and company in the prevention of water disaster in the coal mine

The water disaster restricts the safe production of coal industry severely. During the process of prevention of water disaster, the interest conflicts of every relevant side influence the efficiency of prevention severely. This study selects the local government and coal company as the interest subjects in the prevention of water disaster; firstly the coordination model using the complete information static game theory is established between the two subjects; then the mixed Nash Equilibrium Strategic Function of the model is solved, and the corresponding prevention strategy is proposed according to model´s result. Finally the degree of the influence of increase and decrease of the decisive payoff function on the decisions of local government and coal companies is analyzed by this model based on empirical research. The research shows that in order to prevent the coal mine water disaster effectively, it is necessary to strengthen the supervision of the central government to the local government, increase the input of safety investment of coal company actively, and reduce the punishment cost of the local government reasonably.