Incentivizing local behavior in distributed systems

Game theory is a well-established discipline in the social sciences that is primarily used for modeling social behavior. Traditionally, the preferences of the individual agents are modeled as utility functions and the resulting behavior is assumed to be an equilibrium concept associated with these modeled utility functions, e.g., Nash equilibrium. This is in stark contrast to the role of game theory in engineering systems where the goal is to design both the agents´ utility functions and an adaptation rule such that the resulting global behavior is desirable. The transition of game theory from a modeling tool for social systems to a design tool for engineering systems promotes several new research directions that we will discuss in this talk. In particular, this talk will focus on the question of how to design admissible agent utility functions such that the resulting game possesses desirable properties, e.g., the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria. Our motivation for considering pure Nash equilibria stems from the fact that adaptation rules can frequently be derived which guarantee that the collective behavior will converge to such pure Nash equilibria.