Title :
Research on profit incentive mechanism of general contractor and subcontractors dynamic alliance in construction project
Author :
Yin, Hong-Lian ; Chen, Zhi-yi ; Yang, Yong-zhen ; Sun, Yu-zhuo ; Wu, Jian
Author_Institution :
Shandong Water Polytech., Rizhao, China
Abstract :
It is the key of possessing stable subcontractors and establishing a long-term cooperative partnership that to design sound profit incentive mechanisms and to win-win with subcontractors for general contractor. In the incentive contract of owner, based on the incentive theory and principal-agency model, profit distributing models of general and subcontractors in one-off and long-term cooperation are set up. The results show that the greater the contributions and the lower the effort costs are, the greater the distribution coefficient is; Pareto equilibrium effort level can´t be paid in one-off cooperation, so long-term cooperation should be established between general contractor and subcontractors. A higher distribution coefficient should be given to subcontractor in long-term cooperation than in one-off, the more the cooperation times are, the higher the distribution coefficient is. The conclusions can provide thoughts and scientific basis for the design of the subcontract.
Keywords :
Pareto optimisation; construction industry; profitability; project management; subcontracting; Pareto equilibrium effort; construction project; cooperative partnership; general contractor; incentive theory; principal-agency model; profit incentive mechanism; subcontractor dynamic alliance; Analytical models; Contracts; Games; Loss measurement; Manganese; Organizations; Project management; construction project; general contractor and subcontractors dynamic alliance(GSCDA); incentive mechanism; profit distribution;
Conference_Titel :
Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IE&EM), 2011 IEEE 18Th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Changchun
Print_ISBN :
978-1-61284-446-6
DOI :
10.1109/ICIEEM.2011.6035443