Notice of Violation of IEEE Publication PrinciplesAn intrusion detection system for AODV

Notice of Violation of IEEE Publication Principles

"An Intrusion Detection System for AODV"
by Baolin Sun, Hua Chen, and Layuan Li, in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of Engineering of Complex Computer Systems, 2005.

After careful and considered review of the content and authorship ofthis paper by a duly constituted committee, this paper has been foundto be in violation of IEEE?s Publication Principles.

The first author (Baolin Sun) has taken full responsibility and this violation was done without the knowledge of the other authors (Hua Chen and Layuan Li).

This paper contains significant portions of original text from the paper cited below. The original text was copied without attribution (including appropriate references to the original authors and/or paper title) and without permission. Due to the nature of this violation, reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper, and future references should be made to the following article:

"A Specification-Based Intrusion Detection System for AODV"
by Chin-Yang Tseng, Poornima Balasubramanyam, Calvin Ko, Rattapon Limprasittiporn, Jeff Rowe and Karl Levitt.
in the Proceedings of the 2003 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (SASN-2003), Fairfax, VA USA, 31October 2003.
The ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing protocol, designed for mobile ad hoc networks, offers quick adaptation to dynamic link conditions, low processing and memory overhead, and low network utilization. However, without keeping in mind the security issues in the protocol design, AODV is vulnerable to various kinds of attacks. Intrusion detection, as the second line of defense, is an indispensable tool for highly survivable networks. This paper analyzes some of the vulnerabilities, specifically discussing attacks against AODV that manipulate the routing messages. We propose a solution based on specification-based intrusion detection t- o detect attacks on AODV. Briefly, our approach involves the use of finite state machines for specifying correct AODV routing behavior and distributed network monitors for detecting run-time violation of the specifications. The simulation results indicate that the proposed approach can effectively detect most of the serious AODV routing attacks effectively, and with low overhead.