Analysis of the mechanism of the examinee´s shortage of credibility and integrity under the information economy theory — Taking the on-line regulating matriculation for graduate student for example

The examinee´s shortage of credibility and integrity has hindered the steady and rapid development of the on-line regulating matriculation for graduate student. Many researchers and recruiting departments focus on system setup to strengthen the restraint of the examinee´s dishonest behaviour. Being different from it, this paper attempts to research rational system design based on analyzing the causes of information asymmetry existing in the principal-agent relationship between the recruiting departments and examinees from the perspective of information economy theory. The solutions to lower the on-line regulating matriculation cost and reduce the rate of the examinee´s shortage of credibility and integrity proposed by the authors are as follows: intensifying the information transparency and timeliness of the recruiting departments, adjusting the schedule of the non-regulating matriculation recruiting departments and the regulating matriculation ones and setting up examinee´s credit records.