DocumentCode
3571403
Title
Truthful Allocation of Virtual Machine Instances with the Notion of Combinatorial Auction
Author
Srinivasan, Kasthuri ; Fujita, Satoshi
Author_Institution
Dept. of Inf. Eng., Hiroshima Univ., Higashi-Hiroshima, Japan
fYear
2014
Firstpage
586
Lastpage
590
Abstract
An auction mechanism is said to be truthful if every bidder can maximize her profit by declaring the true valuation of requested items. In this paper, we propose a truthful combinatorial auction-based scheme to allocate virtual machine (VM) instances of various types to the users in clouds so that the total amount of valuations attained by the allocation is maximized. The proposed scheme is an extension of the approximation scheme proposed by Lehmann et al. So that: 1) each user can designate the time period during which requested bundle of items is occupied, and 2) it takes into account the type of instances which was assumed to be identical in the original scheme. The performance of the scheme is evaluated by simulation. The simulation results indicate that the proposed scheme certainly outperforms conventional schemes with respect to the resource utilization, revenue generation, and the allocation efficiency.
Keywords
approximation theory; electronic commerce; operating system kernels; virtual machines; VM; allocation efficiency; approximation scheme; auction mechanism; combinatorial auction; resource utilization; revenue generation; truthful allocation; virtual machine; Approximation methods; Biological system modeling; Cloud computing; Computational modeling; Cost accounting; Resource management; Virtual machining; Cloud Computing; combinatorial auctions; truthful mechanism design; virtual machine allocation;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computing and Networking (CANDAR), 2014 Second International Symposium on
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CANDAR.2014.21
Filename
7052252
Link To Document