• DocumentCode
    3571403
  • Title

    Truthful Allocation of Virtual Machine Instances with the Notion of Combinatorial Auction

  • Author

    Srinivasan, Kasthuri ; Fujita, Satoshi

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Inf. Eng., Hiroshima Univ., Higashi-Hiroshima, Japan
  • fYear
    2014
  • Firstpage
    586
  • Lastpage
    590
  • Abstract
    An auction mechanism is said to be truthful if every bidder can maximize her profit by declaring the true valuation of requested items. In this paper, we propose a truthful combinatorial auction-based scheme to allocate virtual machine (VM) instances of various types to the users in clouds so that the total amount of valuations attained by the allocation is maximized. The proposed scheme is an extension of the approximation scheme proposed by Lehmann et al. So that: 1) each user can designate the time period during which requested bundle of items is occupied, and 2) it takes into account the type of instances which was assumed to be identical in the original scheme. The performance of the scheme is evaluated by simulation. The simulation results indicate that the proposed scheme certainly outperforms conventional schemes with respect to the resource utilization, revenue generation, and the allocation efficiency.
  • Keywords
    approximation theory; electronic commerce; operating system kernels; virtual machines; VM; allocation efficiency; approximation scheme; auction mechanism; combinatorial auction; resource utilization; revenue generation; truthful allocation; virtual machine; Approximation methods; Biological system modeling; Cloud computing; Computational modeling; Cost accounting; Resource management; Virtual machining; Cloud Computing; combinatorial auctions; truthful mechanism design; virtual machine allocation;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computing and Networking (CANDAR), 2014 Second International Symposium on
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CANDAR.2014.21
  • Filename
    7052252