DocumentCode
35952
Title
Security Vulnerabilities of Emerging Nonvolatile Main Memories and Countermeasures
Author
Kannan, S. ; Karimi, N. ; Sinanoglu, O. ; Karri, R.
Author_Institution
Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Polytech. Inst. of New York Univ., New York, NY, USA
Volume
34
Issue
1
fYear
2015
fDate
Jan. 2015
Firstpage
2
Lastpage
15
Abstract
Emerging nonvolatile memory devices such as phase change memories and memristors are replacing SRAM and DRAM. However, nonvolatile main memories (NVMM) are susceptible to probing attacks even when powered down. This way, they may compromise sensitive data such as passwords and keys that reside in the NVMM. To eliminate this vulnerability, we propose sneak-path encryption (SPE), a hardware intrinsic encryption technique for memristor-based NVMMs. SPE is instruction set architecture independent and has minimal impact on performance. SPE exploits the physical parameters, such as sneak-paths in crossbar memories, to encrypt the data stored in a memristor-based NVMM. SPE is resilient to a number of attacks that may be performed on NVMMs. We use a cycle accurate simulator to evaluate the performance impact of SPE-based NVMM and compare against other security techniques. SPE can secure an NVMM with a ~1.3% performance overhead.
Keywords
DRAM chips; SRAM chips; cryptography; instruction sets; memristors; phase change memories; DRAM; SRAM; crossbar memories; hardware intrinsic encryption; instruction set architecture; memristors; nonvolatile main memories; nonvolatile memory devices; phase change memories; sneak-path encryption; Ciphers; Encryption; Memristors; Nonvolatile memory; Random access memory; Encryption; Hardware Security; Memory Security; Memristor; RRAM; hardware security; memory security; memristor;
fLanguage
English
Journal_Title
Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, IEEE Transactions on
Publisher
ieee
ISSN
0278-0070
Type
jour
DOI
10.1109/TCAD.2014.2369741
Filename
6952995
Link To Document