DocumentCode :
3602766
Title :
Keep Your Promise: Mechanism Design Against Free-Riding and False-Reporting in Crowdsourcing
Author :
Xiang Zhang ; Guoliang Xue ; Ruozhou Yu ; Dejun Yang ; Jian Tang
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Comput., Inf., & Decision Syst. Eng., Arizona State Univ., Tempe, AZ, USA
Volume :
2
Issue :
6
fYear :
2015
Firstpage :
562
Lastpage :
572
Abstract :
Crowdsourcing is an emerging paradigm where users can have their tasks completed by paying fees, or receive rewards for providing service. A critical problem that arises in current crowdsourcing mechanisms is how to ensure that users pay or receive what they deserve. Free-riding and false-reporting may make the system vulnerable to dishonest users. In this paper, we design schemes to tackle these problems, so that each individual in the system is better off being honest and each provider prefers completing the assigned task. We first design a mechanism EFF which eliminates dishonest behavior with the help from a trusted third party for arbitration. We then design another mechanism DFF which, without the help from any third party, discourages dishonest behavior. We also prove that DFF is semi-truthful, which discourages dishonest behavior such as free-riding and false-reporting when the rest of the individuals are honest, while guaranteeing transaction-wise budget-balance and computational efficiency. Performance evaluation shows that within our mechanisms, no user could have a utility gain by unilaterally being dishonest.
Keywords :
cloud computing; design; game theory; mobile computing; outsourcing; DFF mechanism design; cloud computing; false-reporting; free-riding; game theory; mobile crowdsourcing; Computational modeling; Crowdsourcing; Game theory; Games; Internet of things; Mobile communication; Warranties; Crowdsourcing; false-reporting; free-riding; game theory; incentive mechanisms;
fLanguage :
English
Journal_Title :
Internet of Things Journal, IEEE
Publisher :
ieee
ISSN :
2327-4662
Type :
jour
DOI :
10.1109/JIOT.2015.2441031
Filename :
7117344
Link To Document :
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