DocumentCode :
3617206
Title :
A study of limited-precision, incremental elicitation in auctions
Author :
A. Kress;C. Boutilier
Author_Institution :
University of Toronto
fYear :
2004
fDate :
6/26/1905 12:00:00 AM
Firstpage :
1344
Lastpage :
1345
Keywords :
"Computer science","Software agents","Cost accounting","Intelligent networks","Business communication","Computer networks","Game theory","Computational complexity","Context","Permission"
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004. Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on
Print_ISBN :
1-58113-864-4
Type :
conf
Filename :
1373701
Link To Document :
https://search.ricest.ac.ir/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=3617206