DocumentCode :
3633013
Title :
Achieving Security Despite Compromise Using Zero-knowledge
Author :
Michael Backes;Martin P. Grochulla;Catalin Hritcu;Matteo Maffei
Author_Institution :
Saarland Univ., Saarbrucken, Germany
fYear :
2009
Firstpage :
308
Lastpage :
323
Abstract :
One of the important challenges when designing and analyzing cryptographic protocols is the enforcement of security properties in the presence of compromised participants. This paper presents a general technique for strengthening cryptographic protocols in order to satisfy authorization policies despite participant compromise. The central idea is to automatically transform the original cryptographic protocols by adding non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.Each participant proves that the messages sent to the other participants are generated in accordance to the protocol.The zero-knowledge proofs are forwarded to ensure the correct behavior of all participants involved in the protocol, without revealing any secret data.We use an enhanced type system for zero-knowledge to verify that the transformed protocols conform to their authorization policy even if some participants are compromised.Finally, we developed a tool that automatically generates ML implementations of protocols based on zero-knowledge proofs.The protocol transformation, the verification, and the generation of protocol implementations are fully automated.
Keywords :
"Cryptographic protocols","Cryptography","Computer security","Authorization","Data security","Libraries","Authentication","Electronic voting","Application software","Digital signatures"
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Computer Security Foundations Symposium, 2009. CSF ´09. 22nd IEEE
ISSN :
1063-6900
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3712-2
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CSF.2009.24
Filename :
5230610
Link To Document :
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