DocumentCode :
3644466
Title :
Computing equilibria for constraint-based negotiation games with interdependent issues
Author :
Mihnea Scafeş;Costin Bădică
Author_Institution :
University of Craiova, Software Engineering Department, Bvd. Decebal 107, Craiova, 200440, Romania
fYear :
2011
Firstpage :
597
Lastpage :
603
Abstract :
Negotiation with interdependent issues and nonlinear, non-monotonic utility functions is difficult because it is hard to efficiently explore the contract space. This paper presents a new result in automated negotiations with interdependent issues, complete information and time constraints. We consider that agents express their preferences using constraints defined as one interval per issue and that we represent their constraint sets as intersection graphs. We model negotiations as a bargaining game and we show that the equilibrium solution is one of the maximal cliques of the constraint graph. Consequently, we find that the problem of computing the equilibrium solution has polynomial-time complexity when the number of issues is fixed.
Keywords :
"Contracts","Games","Time factors","Computational modeling","Complexity theory","Adaptation models","Proposals"
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Computer Science and Information Systems (FedCSIS), 2011 Federated Conference on
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4577-0041-5
Type :
conf
Filename :
6078216
Link To Document :
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