DocumentCode :
3647131
Title :
Side-Channel Analysis of Grøstl and Skein
Author :
Christina Boura;Sylvain Lévêque;David Vigilant
Author_Institution :
Gemalto, Meudon, France
fYear :
2012
fDate :
5/1/2012 12:00:00 AM
Firstpage :
16
Lastpage :
26
Abstract :
This work provides a detailed study of two finalists of the SHA-3 competition from the side-channel analysis point of view. For both functions when used as a MAC, this paper presents detected strategies for performing a power analysis. Besides the classical MAC mode, two additionally proposed constructions, the envelope MAC for Grøstl and the Skein-MAC for Skein, are analyzed. Consequently, examples of software countermeasures thwarting first-order DPA or CPA are given. For the validation of our choices, we implemented HMAC-Grøstl, HMAC-Skein as well as countermeasure son a 32-bit ARM-based smart card. We also mounted power analysis attacks in practice on both unprotected and protected implementations. Finally, the performance difference between both versions is discussed.
Keywords :
"Correlation","Smart cards","Hamming weight","Resistance","Cryptography","NIST"
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), 2012 IEEE Symposium on
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4673-2157-0
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/SPW.2012.13
Filename :
6227680
Link To Document :
بازگشت