Title :
Contracts of reverse logistics with different risk preferences
Author :
Qiaolun Gu;Tiegang Gao
Author_Institution :
School of Economics and Management, Tianjin University of Technology and Education, China
Abstract :
The reverse supply chain in our study consists of the disassembly centre and the collector. In this paper, we study the contract of the reverse supply chain with risk-neutral collector and risk-averse disassembly centre. Furthermore, we compare the contract with other two contracts given by our previous research: contract of risk-neutral collector and risk-neutral disassembly centre, and contract of risk-averse collector and risk-neutral disassembly centre. At the end, we analyze the optimal results by a numerical example. From the analysis, we find: if the disassembly centre is risk averse and the collector is risk neutral, the collector must share a large part of the penalty. This will result in a smaller optimal quantity of the used-products and lower profit of the collector and the disassembly centre.
Keywords :
"Supply chains","Contracts","Tin","Investment","Electronic waste","Reverse logistics","Profitability"
Conference_Titel :
Information and Automation, 2015 IEEE International Conference on
DOI :
10.1109/ICInfA.2015.7279635