DocumentCode :
3666573
Title :
Quantifying & minimizing attack surfaces containing moving target defenses
Author :
Nathaniel Soule;Borislava Simidchieva;Fusun Yaman;Ronald Watro;Joseph Loyall;Michael Atighetchi;Marco Carvalho;David Last;David Myers;Bridget Flatley
Author_Institution :
Raytheon BBN Technologies Cambridge, MA
fYear :
2015
fDate :
8/1/2015 12:00:00 AM
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
6
Abstract :
The cyber security exposure of resilient systems is frequently described as an attack surface. A larger surface area indicates increased exposure to threats and a higher risk of compromise. Ad-hoc addition of dynamic proactive defenses to distributed systems may inadvertently increase the attack surface. This can lead to cyber friendly fire, a condition in which adding superfluous or incorrectly configured cyber defenses unintentionally reduces security and harms mission effectiveness. Examples of cyber friendly fire include defenses which themselves expose vulnerabilities (e.g., through an unsecured admin tool), unknown interaction effects between existing and new defenses causing brittleness or unavailability, and new defenses which may provide security benefits, but cause a significant performance impact leading to mission failure through timeliness violations. This paper describes a prototype service capability for creating semantic models of attack surfaces and using those models to (1) automatically quantify and compare cost and security metrics across multiple surfaces, covering both system and defense aspects, and (2) automatically identify opportunities for minimizing attack surfaces, e.g., by removing interactions that are not required for successful mission execution.
Keywords :
"Measurement","Security","Analytical models","Computational modeling","Minimization","Surface treatment","IP networks"
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Resilience Week (RWS), 2015
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/RWEEK.2015.7287449
Filename :
7287449
Link To Document :
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