DocumentCode :
3674774
Title :
Clockwise Randomization of the Observable Behaviour of Crypto ASICs to Counter Side Channel Attacks
Author :
Zoya Dyka;Christian Wittke;Peter Langendoerfer
Author_Institution :
IHP, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
fYear :
2015
Firstpage :
551
Lastpage :
554
Abstract :
Side channel attacks take advantage from the fact that the behavior of crypto implementations can be observed and provides hints that allow revealing keys. In this paper we present a novel approach to prevent SCA or at least to increase the effort to reveal keys significantly. Our approach is based on the fact that there are some functions used in cryptographic operations that can be implemented using different formulae or algorithms. These algorithms come with their individual complexity that results in individual circuits with individual power consumption. So, if the crypto implementation uses these different algorithms whenever it is executed or if the sequence in which the different algorithms are used is randomized, extracting the key gets extremely challenging if not impossible. Applying our idea is extremely challenging when it comes to ASIC implementations. The point here is that the functionality is fixed and cannot be altered after production. But we discuss that a runtime permutation of the relation between operands and algorithms used for their processing that alters the observable behavior in the same way as executing different algorithms.
Keywords :
"Elliptic curve cryptography","Runtime","Clocks","Power demand","Complexity theory","Hardware"
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Digital System Design (DSD), 2015 Euromicro Conference on
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/DSD.2015.40
Filename :
7302324
Link To Document :
بازگشت