DocumentCode
3678488
Title
QaSten: Integrating Quantitative Verification with Safety Analysis for AADL Model
Author
Xiaomin Wei;Yunwei Dong;Hong Ye
Author_Institution
Sch. of Comput. Sci. &
fYear
2015
Firstpage
103
Lastpage
110
Abstract
Quantitative verification is an effective technique for analyzing quantitative aspects of a safety critical system´s design, and safety analysis is a significant aspect of safety critical system. However, they are often conducted separately. In this paper, we propose a new methodology, QaSten, fastens quantitative verification to safety analysis for Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) model (including error model). QaSten formalizes a set of rigorous transformation rules that transform AADL model to PRISM model using formal method. In addition, QaSten can generate two safety property formulas automatically to check against the PRISM model for each hazardous state. Therefore, the occurrence probability of hazardous states can be calculated, which can help system designers understand the impact of parameters in the model. Furthermore, combining the probability and the severity of potential consequence of a hazardous state, QaSten determines the hazard risk acceptance level that can help engineers to identify critical hazard and modify or redesign architecture model to control it in an acceptable level. Two case studies, based on the Gas Leakage Alarm systems, are utilized to demonstrate QaSten´s feasibility and effectiveness.
Keywords
"Analytical models","Receivers","Hazards","Mathematical model","Computer architecture","Transforms"
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Theoretical Aspects of Software Engineering (TASE), 2015 International Symposium on
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/TASE.2015.10
Filename
7307740
Link To Document