DocumentCode
3732293
Title
STUMP - STalling offline password attacks Using pre-hash ManiPulations
Author
Avinash Srinivasan;Anthony Nguyen;Robert Tarlecki
Author_Institution
Comput. &
fYear
2015
Firstpage
306
Lastpage
313
Abstract
Offline password cracking has seen significant advances in recent years. This is mainly due to a dramatic increase in accessible computational speeds and the increased exploitation of GPUs for parallel processing. Cheaper and faster hardware, combined with new techniques, have allowed inexpensive GPUs to crack passwords at rates which only supercomputers could achieve previously. One inexpensive mitigation technique that we have uncovered is built on the core idea of pre-hash password manipulations. Our technique is named STUMP. Through rigorous empirical analysis, we demonstrate that STUMP can prevent offline parallel attacks - including pre-computed attacks utilizing rainbow tables - from cracking 99.718% of passwords that are <;8-characters in length; STUMP has also shown to completely prevent the attacker from cracking passwords that are ≥ 8 characters in length i.e., (100% secure). Finally, for all cases, STUMP can be employed to stall the attacks - regardless of whether the attack is a laborious brute-force technique or a more intelligent dictionary attack - as neither will return the user´s original password.
Keywords
"Dictionaries","Authentication","Hardware","Graphics processing units","Radiation detectors","Parallel processing"
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS), 2015 IEEE 21st International Conference on
Electronic_ISBN
1521-9097
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICPADS.2015.46
Filename
7384309
Link To Document