Towards a P2P mobile contents trading

In this work, we investigate the profit maximization problem for a wireless network carrier and the payment minimization for users. We focus on the scenario whereby users who are equipped with device-to-device (D2D) communication can harness their predictable demand in proactive data contents caching and the possibility of trading their proactive downloads to minimize their expected payments. The carrier, on the other hand, utilizes a dynamic pricing scheme to differentiate between off-peak and peak time prices and applies commissions on each trading process to further maximize its profit. A marketplace based on risk sharing between users is proposed where the tension between carrier and users is formulated as a Stackelberg game. We explore the win-win equilibrium of the proposed model and compare it with the baseline scenario of flat pricing. We characterize a new equilibria region which yields to a win-win situation with respect to the baseline equilibrium. We show that the equilibria region expands when the carrier allows this marketplace to happen between end-users.