A study for retailer´s risk hedge considering responses of consumers in electricity deregulation

Recently in Japan, a deregulation of electricity market is being extended and retailers are expected to supply the electricity to consumers. Moreover, an energy management system enables the consumers to easily manage their energy consumption according to the electricity prices. This means that a large number of decision makers who manages electricity energy will be in the electricity market. In order to operate stably the next generation power system, in which the structure of the system is complicated, it is necessary to appropriately design the market based on a detail market analysis with a mathematical model of the decision makers. Thus, to formulate a mathematical model that adequately represents the behavior of a large number of decision-makers in the power market is indispensable. From this background, we formulates a Stackelberg game model as the bilevel programming problem which represents the statistical decision making in a trade between the retailer and the consumers considering a forward contract and day-ahead market, real time trade. The computational experiment shows that the proposed decision making model can represents the behavior of the market players.