The impact of transmission on imperfect electricity competition

Author

Yu, Z. ; Sparrow, F.T. ; Gotham, D. ; Holland, F. ; Nderitu, D.G. ; Morin, T.

Author_Institution

Sch. of Ind. Eng., Purdue Univ., West Lafayette, IN, USA

Volume

1

fYear

2002

fDate

2002

Firstpage

95

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of transmission networks on imperfect competition in deregulated electricity markets. Electricity producers are assumed to engage on a noncooperative gaming with complete but imperfect information. The problem is formulated as a vector profit optimization model. It shows that increasing wheeling charges can both increase market prices and reduce producers´ profits, a phenomenon that cannot be explained by a nonspatial framework. Transmission limits have a significant impact on outcomes of market gaming, indicating that reducing transmission congestion would mitigate market power.

Keywords

commerce; electricity supply industry; game theory; power system economics; transmission networks; deregulated electricity markets; imperfect electricity competition; market gaming; market power mitigation; market prices; noncooperative gaming; profits; transmission congestion; transmission networks impact; vector profit optimization model; wheeling charges; Economic forecasting; Electricity supply industry; Electricity supply industry deregulation; Equations; Industrial engineering; Intelligent networks; Load flow; Nash equilibrium; Power system modeling; Transportation;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Power Engineering Society Winter Meeting, 2002. IEEE

Print_ISBN

0-7803-7322-7

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/PESW.2002.984960

Filename

984960