Power allocation of jamming attackers against PEV charging stations: A game theoretical approach

This paper considers a system consisting of multiple attackers, lots of charging stations and plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). The attackers conduct channel jamming attacks and benefit from snatching customers (i.e., PEVs) from the victim charging stations. Suppose that the attackers are selfish and they attempt to maximize their own average net revenue per unit time. We aim to investigate the problem of how to appropriately choose its transmit power to conduct the jamming attack for every attacker. We formulate this problem as a noncooperative game, and show the existence of its solution, i.e., a Nash equilibrium (NE). Due to the existence of some coupling constraints, the game is a Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP), which is usually hard to solve. To overcome this challenge, here we introduce a variation inequality (VI) approach. More specifically, we treat the game as a VI problem, and prove the existence of its solution. We develop an iterative algorithm to compute the solution to the VI problem, which corresponds to an NE of our game. Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness and the efficiency of our proposed algorithm.