Strategic bidding in an optimal power flow electricity market

Author

Rourke, Shane ; O´Malley, Mark ; Miyakawa, Kado ; Liu, Chen-Ching

Author_Institution

Dept. of Electron. & Electr. Eng., Univ. Coll. Dublin, Ireland

Volume

2

fYear

2003

fDate

23-26 June 2003

Abstract

Strategic bidding to take advantage of global or local market power is a concern in many of the new electricity markets. Here the characteristics of the optimal power flow (OPF) market-clearing paradigm are studied analytically and by simulation. Although it is shown that the OPF algorithm is vulnerable to strategic behavior there is a self-regulating mechanism, which limits the abuses. Gaming by selectively congesting a particular transmission line is shown to be possible under the assumption of perfect information.

Keywords

load flow; power markets; power system simulation; power transmission lines; strategic planning; OPF; OPF algorithm; congestion management; electricity market; gaming transmission constraints; market-clearing paradigm; optimal power flow; self-regulating mechanism; strategic behavior; strategic bidding; transmission line; Analytical models; Consumer electronics; Costs; Electricity supply industry; Energy management; Load flow; Mesh generation; Power system management; Power transmission lines; User centered design;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Power Tech Conference Proceedings, 2003 IEEE Bologna

Print_ISBN

0-7803-7967-5

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/PTC.2003.1304606

Filename

1304606