DocumentCode :
414963
Title :
Nash equilibria as a fundamental issue concerning network-switches design
Author :
Georgakopoulos, George F.
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Crete Univ., Greece
Volume :
2
fYear :
2004
fDate :
20-24 June 2004
Firstpage :
1080
Abstract :
We view the ´packet-switching problem´ (from N inputs towards N outputs) from the perspective of game theory and we prove that, if the rates of flows are weighed then ´weighed max-min fair service rates´ are the unique Nash equilibrium point of a natural strategic game in which throughput is granted on a ´least-demanding first-served´ principle. We prove that a crossbar switching device with suitably randomized schedulers converges to this equilibrium point without pre-computing it.
Keywords :
game theory; minimax techniques; packet switching; Nash equilibria; crossbar switching; game theory; least-demanding first-served principle; network-switches design; packet-switching problem; weighed max-min fair service rates; Computer science; Fabrics; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Protocols; Reverse engineering; Switches; TCPIP; Throughput; Traffic control;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Communications, 2004 IEEE International Conference on
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-8533-0
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICC.2004.1312667
Filename :
1312667
Link To Document :
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