VPEF: A Simple and Effective Incentive Mechanism in Community-Based Autonomous Networks

This paper focuses on incentivizing cooperative behavior in community-based autonomous networking environments (like mobile social networks, etc.), in which through dynamically forming virtual and/or physical communities, users voluntarily participate in and contribute resources (or provide services) to the community while consuming. Specifically, we proposed a simple but effective EGT (Evolutionary Game Theory)-based mechanism, VPEF (Voluntary Principle and round-based Entry Fee), to drive the networking environment into cooperative. VPEF builds incentive mechanism as two simple system rules: The first is VP meaning that all behaviors are voluntarily conducted by users: Users voluntarily participate (after paying round-based entry fee), voluntarily contribute resource, and voluntarily punish other defectors (incurring extra cost to those so-called punishers); The second is EF meaning that an arbitrarily small round-based entry fee is set for each user who wants to participate in the community. We presented a generic analytical framework of evolutionary dynamics to model VPEF scheme, and theoretically proved that VPEF scheme´s efficiency loss defined as the ratio of system time, in which no users will provide resource, is $4/(8+M)$. $M$ is the number of users in community-based collaborative system. Finally, the simulated results using content availability as an example verified our theoretical analysis.