A tabu search algorithm for attack-aware lightpath routing

Attacks in Transparent Optical Networks present a serious security threat to successful network operation due to the high data rates involved and the vulnerabilities associated with transparency. Typical physical layer attacks can involve injecting high-powered jamming signals on legitimate data channels to exploit vulnerabilities in optical components such as crosstalk in switches and fibers, and gain competition in amplifiers. To assure a certain quality of service in the network, we propose a novel approach which considers such security threats during the network planning process. More specifically, we propose a tabu search heuristic aimed to perform lightpath routing in such a way as to minimize the possible dasiareachabilitypsila of a jamming attack with respect to gain competition and inter-channel crosstalk. In this way we limit the worst case scenario which can potentially be caused by such an attack. We tested the algorithm on the 14-node NSF network and compare with shortest path routing. The algorithm not only yields better attack protection, but reduces lightpath congestion and minimizes the upper bound on the number of wavelengths needed for wavelength assignment.