Notice of RetractionResearch on the optimal incentive contract considering contractor’s intrinsic motivation in the construction quality insurance system

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

With the rapid development of the national real estate industry, we are encountering an unprecedented engineering quality safety challenge in China, and it requires that we should establish the construction quality insurance system to conform to the situation. In order to resolve the moral hazard and adverse selection problems of the contractor in the construction quality insurance system, the insurer must design a set of optimal incentive contracts for contractors to be selected, so as to judge their true information in terms of their selecting results and make them work hard. Considering the contractorpsilas intrinsic motivation, this paper sets up an optimal incentive contract model when both contractorpsilas types and actions are unobservable. Following the revelation principle, we analyze and solve the model by applying the optimal controlling theory, and we discuss the importance of intrinsic motivation. The conclusions show that the intrinsic motivation is more efficient than extrinsic incentive. Accordingly the insurer should fully consider the contractorspsila intrinsic motivation in the contract.