DocumentCode :
485497
Title :
Theory of Bargaining Process: A Game Theoretical Approach
Author :
Mori, Sliozo ; Tse, Edison
Author_Institution :
Research Engineer, Advanced Information and Decision Systems, Mountain View, California.
fYear :
1982
fDate :
14-16 June 1982
Firstpage :
133
Lastpage :
138
Abstract :
Based on bargaining problems in the form that J. Nash originally formulated, a two-person bargaining process is modelled as an infinite game in extensive form. In this game, both bargainers make their proposals in terms of the utility pair resulting from possible agreement, and express approval or disapproval, alternatively changing roles. The existence and the uniqueness of subgame-perfect pure-strategy Nash equilibrium are explored. Limiting results when the time between bargaining sessions becomes shorter and shorter are connected with one of the conventional bargaining theories. Throughout this note, time-preference modelled by constant discounting plays an important role.
Keywords :
Cost function; Game theory; Hilbert space; Information analysis; Random variables; Stochastic processes;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
American Control Conference, 1982
Conference_Location :
Arlington, VA, USA
Type :
conf
Filename :
4787819
Link To Document :
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