DocumentCode :
511134
Title :
Game Analysis on the Double Principal-Agent Risk in Risk Investment
Author :
Yang, Jinting ; Sun, Zilai ; Liu, Yinghui
Author_Institution :
Handan Coll., Handan, China
fYear :
2009
fDate :
19-20 Dec. 2009
Firstpage :
159
Lastpage :
162
Abstract :
In the risk investment system, whether the double principal-agent relationship which is formed by different interest subjects can smoothly operate is the key to determine the success of risk investment, yet the issue of information asymmetry in the field is more serious than other industry, so that double principal-agent relationship formed in it exists huge risks. A series of binding agreements and institutional arrangements can be reached among different interest subjects and strictly observed by all game parties, then this cooperative game can make the parties have sustained and stable income, and reached the win-win cooperation of game with incomplete information, so as to effectively restrain the double principal-agent risk.
Keywords :
game theory; investment; risk analysis; binding agreements; cooperative game; double principal-agent risk; game analysis; information asymmetry; institutional arrangements; principal-agent relationship; risk investment system; Conference management; Educational institutions; Engineering management; Ethics; Investments; Knowledge engineering; Knowledge management; Risk analysis; Risk management; Venture capital; Adverse selection; Double Principal-agent risk; Game analysis; Moral hazard; Risk investment;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Knowledge Engineering and Software Engineering, 2009. KESE '09. Pacific-Asia Conference on
Conference_Location :
Shenzhen
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3916-4
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/KESE.2009.49
Filename :
5383594
Link To Document :
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