Notice of RetractionEvolutionary game analysis on management of knowledge employee

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

At present, by using qualitative methods, many scholars studied their motivation mechanisms and analyzed their motivation factor and processes from the perspective of behavior and psychology, but attempts to consider the interaction among the knowledge employees, between the knowledge employees and the enterprises have been very few. So, this paper establishes two evolutionary game models for studying motivation mechanisms of the knowledge employees under the assumptions that the enterprises and the knowledge employees all have bounded rationality. By using replicator dynamics equations, this paper analyses the strategy choice on the interaction between the knowledge employees and the enterprises, among the knowledge employees, and furthermore, discusses the evolutionary stability strategies of the knowledge employees and the enterprises.