• DocumentCode
    526993
  • Title

    The equilibrium analysis of actors´ decision in circular economy system

  • Author

    Liu Wei ; Chen Jing-xin

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Econ. & Manage., North China Inst. of Aerosp. Eng., Langfang, China
  • Volume
    2
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    17-18 July 2010
  • Firstpage
    187
  • Lastpage
    190
  • Abstract
    Developing circular economy can maximize resources and energy efficiency, minimize waste and protect our environment. It needs to coordinate all aspects of interest to build the circular economy system. Based on game theory, this paper researched the relationship among different actors and the equilibrium analysis of their decision in circular economy system. It pointed out that the balanced state of equilibrium could be promoted from second-best equilibrium to optimal equilibrium through active adjustment of government policies. The measures included strengthening environmental legislation to regulate the behavior of government, enterprises and the public; building policy support system to guide the behavior of market players and so on. In addition, improving of science, technology and market mechanism could spontaneously complete the circular economy system. Through the above measures, we could promote the establishment of circular economy system.
  • Keywords
    environmental economics; environmental legislation; game theory; government policies; macroeconomics; actors decision; circular economy system; environmental legislation; environmental protection; equilibrium analysis; game theory; government behavior; government policies; market players; policy support system; resource maximization; waste minimization; Games; Nash equilibrium; Production; Recycling; Waste materials; circular economy; equilibrium analysis; game theory;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Environmental Science and Information Application Technology (ESIAT), 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Wuhan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-7387-8
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ESIAT.2010.5567310
  • Filename
    5567310