Impact of blackhole and Sybil attacks on dynamic windows secured implicit geographic forwarding routing protocol

Dynamic windows implicit geographic forwarding (DWSIGF) routing protocol promises a minimal selection on attacker as a hop node. However, it was tested only on blackhole attack with a single optimal attacker. Thus, a thorough investigation was performed to examine whether the protocol is secure against other routing attacks. This study presents a comprehensive analysis of an impact of blackhole and Sybil attacks on the DWSIGF. The analyses on blackhole attack were carried out on a single and multiple attackers using priority selection, random selection, an optimal relay, non-optimal relay, with and without clear to send (CTS) rushing attack. While on the other hand, the Sybil attack´s analyses were investigated on the impact of single attacker using optimal and non-optimal relay over increasing traffic loads and growing number of Sybil attackers. The study showed that the DWSIGF promised a superior protection against blackhole/selective forwarding and Sybil attacks with minimum attacker selection and high performance in packet delivery ratio even without inserting any security mechanism in the routing protocol.