Title :
Optimal form & deadline for paying insurance agents their commission
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Beijing Univ. of Aeronaut. & Astronaut., Beijing, China
Abstract :
In view of this question, whether lengthening the deadline of commission payment can effectively restrict the occurrence of myopia action of the insurance agent, a long-term principal-agent model and a model of the best deadline of commission payment are established. It´s proved that the optimal insurance contract must have the part of fixed wages. A formula for the best deadline of commission payment is given. Meanwhile the models of the reference and are improved, and also some conclusions of those references are strengthened.
Keywords :
insurance; commission payment; deadline; insurance agent payment; long-term principal-agent model; myopia action; optimal form; optimal insurance contract; Biological system modeling; Economics; Educational institutions; insurance agent; insurance commission; insurance contract; principal-agent;
Conference_Titel :
Future Information Technology and Management Engineering (FITME), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Changzhou
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-9087-5
DOI :
10.1109/FITME.2010.5654876